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The Special Broadcasting Service and the future 
of multiculturalism: an Insight into 
contemporary challenges and future directions 
Joshua M. Roose and Shahram Akbarzadeh  
Abstract 
In the past decade multiculturalism across Western nations has come under 
sustained critique and attack from its political opponents. It has been asserted that 
multiculturalism leads to the creation of ghettos and segregated communities, 
which undermine liberal democratic values and heighten the risk of attraction to 
extremist violence, particularly in regard to Muslim communities. The ferocity of 
these attacks has led many scholars to claim that multiculturalism is ‘in retreat’. 
But such claims have rarely been tested as they relate to publicly funded 
government agencies and institutions. These are key sites governing the daily 
practice and representation of multiculturalism that impact on populations in 
everyday life. In the Australian context, the Special Broadcasting Service (SBS) is 
a pivotal example of a multicultural institution, with its programming and 
community engagement widely considered among the world’s best practice in 
promoting pluralism and respect between cultures. In more recent times, however, 
a series of controversial episodes on the network’s flagship ‘ideas forum’, the 
Insight television program, have led to anger in Australian Muslim communities, 
and a boycott by a variety of community leaders, academics and activists. This 
study reveals a notable shift away from the core values of multiculturalism in the 
SBS and Australian society. 
Keywords: Australian Muslims, Islam, multicultural broadcasting, 
multiculturalism, Special Broadcasting Service (SBS) 
Introduction 
The post 9/11 decade in Australia and many other Western states has been defined by 
the securitisation of governmental approaches to Islam and the Muslim population. 
Questions of loyalty and identity thrown at Muslim citizens have become commonplace 
in mainstream political discourse. As Mohamad Abdalla (2010, p. 26) argues, ‘post-
September 11, 2001, Australian Muslims have increasingly been viewed as “culturally 
incompatible” [and] “as a potential political threat to national security”’. Events since 
2001, in particular the 7/7 2005 London bombings conducted by British-born-and-
raised Muslim men, have seen multiculturalism become entwined with the Muslim 
question and blamed in right-wing circles for creating ghettos of disloyalty. Debates 
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about Muslim identity have become central to questions about the continued viability of 
multiculturalism as a social system (Modood 2010, p. 158; Levey 2010, p. 30).  
In the wake of the European sovereign debt crisis and economic instability, 2010 and 
2011 became milestone years for public condemnations of multiculturalism by national 
leaders throughout Europe. In February 2011 the British Prime Minister, David 
Cameron, declared that multiculturalism had ‘failed’ to provide a national vision to 
which Muslims would want to belong (Cameron 2011) while the Dutch Interior 
Minister released a report in June 2011 that stated:  
The government shares the social dissatisfaction over the multicultural society 
model and plans to shift priority to the values of the Dutch people. In the new 
integration system, the values of the Dutch society play a central role. With this 
change, the government steps away from the model of a multicultural society.  
(Donner 2011) 
The Dutch Government outlined plans to follow the French in banning the burqa from 
2013, following in the footsteps of strictly integrationist countries such as France.  
In Australia and Canada, where multiculturalism has been a defining national 
characteristic in a bipartisan approach (Bowen 2011; Abbott cited in Lapkin 2011; 
Harper 2011), the topic of Muslim integration has over the past decade become a key 
platform for gaining political advantage. Australian Muslims have been consistently 
singled out for public rebuke by Australian politicians. Speaking in 2010 the current 
Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, and Opposition leader Tony Abbott both labelled the 
burqa, worn by a small minority of women, as ‘confronting’, and in 2011 and 2012 
successive Federal Attorney Generals strongly rejected any potential for legal pluralism 
and the accommodation of sharia, signalling a nascent desire to return to the 
assimilationist approach to Australian citizenship (McClelland cited in Karvelas 2011; 
Roxon cited in Karvelas 2012). Recent work by Maddox (2005) and Fozdar (2011) has 
documented the simultaneous emergence of public discourse emphasising Australia’s 
Christian heritage and values, and its role in acting to exclude citizens of other faiths, 
further undermining multiculturalism. The renewed emphasis over the past decade 
upon an increasingly vigorous approach to citizenship has led many scholars to argue 
that multiculturalism is ‘in retreat’ (Joppke 2004; Turner 2006; Poynting & Mason 
2008) or even ‘purged’ (Colic-Peisker 2011).  
The thesis that multiculturalism is ‘in retreat’ relies primarily on public speeches and 
policy statements written by politicians for political contingency, or broad quantitative 
datasets measuring individual attitudes. Far less work has been undertaken at the 
qualitative empirical level to understand how this ‘retreat’ from multiculturalism is 
enacted, if at all, in publicly funded institutions typically less influenced by the extremes 
of contemporaneous political debate, and how this plays out at the micro level in 
Australia’s diverse communities. Yet it is on this ground, the interface between powerful 
institutions and citizens, that these developments have the potential to have the most 
long-lasting effects and to shape the lives of those citizens most vulnerable in these 
debates. Religious minorities and, particularly in the current climate, Muslim 
communities are some of those most potentially vulnerable to the power of institutions. 
This is especially the case in Australia, where Muslims make up just over two percent of 
ROOSE & AKBARZADEH— THE SPECIAL BROADCASTING SERVICE AND THE 
FUTURE OF MULTICULTURALISM 
95 
the population yet experience extraordinarily high rates of poverty (Hassan 2009; 
Hassan 2010, p. 580) and imprisonment (Cooper 2008).  
Media coverage of Islam and Muslims in Australia, particularly in the post-9/11 
environment, plays a critical role in reinforcing negative stereotypes among the wider 
Australian public. Basic examples of negative coverage may include what Persinger 
(2010, pp. 50–1) considers prolific reporting ‘on radical Australian Muslims with 
extreme views while failing to comprehensively cover international news that could serve 
to educate audiences about the diversity of Muslim society and identity’. According to 
Anne Aly (2007, p. 28), ‘the underlying assumption in the media discourse in the so 
called “war on terror” is that Islam is backward, secular resistant and incompatible with 
the ideals and values of Western liberal democracy’. Samina Yasmeen (2008, pp. 50–1) 
has noted that the media is perceived by Australian Muslims as an active contributor to 
their exclusion and negative stereotyping. Yasmeen ascribes this to the media’s need to 
sensationalise and to make profit. Research by Halim Rane (2010, p. 108) in the 
traditionally conservative state of Queensland reveals that almost 80 per cent of the 
population rely on the media as their primary source of information about Islam and 
Muslims, with television news and current affairs programs the primary source of 
information about Islam and Muslims (for 62 per cent of those surveyed). When these 
findings are considered in relation to research conducted by Kevin Dunn (2005), 
revealing that over half of Australians surveyed know little about Islam and Muslims 
(and that significant numbers of respondents felt threatened by Islam), it is clear that 
television networks possess an extraordinary level of power in representing Islam to a 
broader non-Muslim Australian public and in shaping public perceptions. The effects of 
this power, if misapplied through the media, have real-life impacts on Australian 
Muslims. Drawing on a 2003 Racism Monitor and 2004 Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Report authored by Scott Poynting and Greg Noble, Dunn, Klocker and 
Salabay note: 
The negativity has material impacts upon Australian Muslims. Such constructions 
(mis)inform opposition to mosque development … , and lie behind arson attacks 
and racist violence … acts of discrimination, verbal abuse and violence were 
commonplace for Australian Muslims. 
(Dunn, Klocker & Salabay 2007, p. 582) 
In the Australian context, the SBS television network stands as the embodiment of a 
state-funded multicultural institution that has historically stood in contrast to such 
vilification. Founded in 1980 to promote the Australian government’s commitment to 
multiculturalism, the SBS differs significantly from the commercial networks. It has 
what may be considered a socially inclusivist approach built into its charter, provided in 
the Special Broadcasting Service Act 1991. The SBS Charter (SBS 2011a), based on 
the Special Broadcasting Service Act 1991, clearly projects a socially inclusivist vision 
reflecting the era in which it came into being. Key facets of the Charter state that the 
network must (1) ‘reflect Australia’s multicultural society’, (2a) ‘contribute to meeting 
the communication needs of Australia’s multicultural society’, (2b) ‘increase awareness 
of the contribution of a diversity of cultures to the continuing development of 
Australian society’, (2c) ‘promote understanding and acceptance of the cultural, 
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linguistic and ethnic diversity of the Australian people’ and (2h) ‘reflect the changing 
nature of Australian society, by presenting many points of view and using innovative 
forms of expression’ (SBS 2011a). These components of the Charter directly reflect 
what Jakubowicz (2006, p. 254) has labelled the ‘transformational cultural interaction’ 
perspective of multiculturalism: 
It recognises that in multicultural societies, there will always be intergenerational 
melding and transformation of cultural expression with a healthy awareness of and 
respect for the many trajectories that bring people into the same social world from 
very different backgrounds ... In particular, its paradigm of reciprocal respect of 
diversity would place obligations on everyone to recognise the human in other 
members of society and be equipped through education and wider social debate 
with the skills to engage sympathetically with views rather different to their own.  
(Jakubowicz 2006, p. 254) 
The contemporary SBS operating environment: 
context and challenges 
The SBS has faced a variety of well-documented challenges throughout its history as a 
multicultural broadcaster. The two primary issues relate to recurrent funding challenges 
(and adoption of advertising as a form of revenue) and questions about whether the 
network truly reflects a multicultural society or merely reinforces hegemonic Anglo-
Australian values.  
Funding challenges 
Network funding has been an issue impacting on multicultural broadcasters worldwide, 
as they have had to come to terms with an increasingly competitive environment; SBS is 
no exception. Bruce Meagher (2009, p. 20), the former Director of Strategy and 
Communication at SBS, states that in the six years leading up to 2009, the Australian 
Broadcasting Commission (ABC) was ahead $270 million from government funding, 
while the SBS was trailing significantly behind on just $17 million in government 
funding.1 This clearly places pressure on the network to raise revenue from other 
sources—primarily advertising. Ratings are essential to advertising premiums; the 
higher the ratings for a given program, the greater the market demand for advertising 
space and the consequent exposure to potential customers. This is a challenge that finds 
strong parallels with other multicultural broadcasters. In the case of the United 
Kingdom’s Channel 4, Sarita Malik notes: 
An increasingly competitive marketplace … has undermined many of the values of 
Channel 4’s original remit and, to a certain extent, the public’s trust in the 
channel. In the past such developments has involved investment and 
disinvestment, transparency and duplicity, and a trajectory that can most 
straightforwardly be described as moving from the radical to the conventional. 
The ‘duty to be different’ has therefore been challenged both by intensifying 
market completion and the broader political emphasis on the ‘duty to integrate’. 
(Malik 2008, p. 344)  
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In the New Zealand context, Donald Reid (2011) has argued the significance of 
tensions between commercial and public service programming that are evident in the 
TVNZ network. Such tensions have negatively impacted the quality of multicultural 
programming: 
Because the majority of TVNZ’s revenue is generated from advertising, a logical 
choice for TVNZ (as a commercial broadcaster) is to screen populist high-rating 
imported material at primetime, with locally-made public service material 
screened at low rating (thus low revenue generating) periods of the schedule. But 
as the state-owned network, TVNZ faces political and public pressure to function 
both as a platform for local production (especially high quality material targeting a 
prime time audience); and as a forum to represent minority interest groups.  
(Reid 2011, p. 62) 
SBS vigorously markets its advertising space as appealing to a higher educated and 
higher earning demographic passionately committed to the network, thus seeking to 
distinguish its program space as different from the mainstream television networks. But, 
of the SBS network’s top-rating programs for 2010, nine out of ten were either the 
Football World Cup or Top Gear, while the Football World Cup, Top Gear and Man 
vs. Wild combined to take 18 of the top 20 programs for the year. Another top-20 
program, James May’s Toy Stories featured a host from Top Gear and may be included 
within the same genre. Nearly all (95 per cent) of SBS’s top-rating programs for 2010 
were commercially oriented with very little to distinguish them from programs on 
mainstream free-to-air commercial networks.  
The SBS network, then, faces the challenge of increasing its ratings and, thus, 
advertising revenue; commercial content is one of few mechanisms with which to 
achieve this. On the other hand, the network must still continue to abide by the SBS 
Charter and produce high quality (albeit lower rating) multicultural programming.  
Debates about SBS’s multicultural credentials 
Critics have focused on two core areas: first, the perceived relegation of ethnic minority 
concerns and representations to an individual television station, and second, an alleged 
shift in the service towards ‘addressing only a privileged Anglo-Australian audience 
interested in consuming representations of difference’ (Smaill 2002, p. 397). The SBS is 
cast as a ghetto of non-Australian cultures mashed together and away from the 
mainstream networks, and simultaneously as a place for more educated and wealthy 
Australians to consume ethnic cultures while maintaining their hegemony. Both of 
these developments are argued to have the effect of reinforcing the dominant national 
Anglo-Australian identity as the norm. These criticisms draw upon a wider body of 
literature critiquing multiculturalism, and fit especially well with the views of Ghassan 
Hage, who has famously posited the concept of ‘White multiculturalism’ in which 
Aboriginal people and non-white ‘ethnics’ are objects to be governed, ensuring a 
continuation of the core European national identity (Hage 1998, pp. 11–14). 
Brett Nicholls (2011) argues a very similar line with specific reference to the SBS 
television program East West 101, produced by Knapman Wyld Television (2007-
2011). In a well-articulated dissection of the program’s first series on SBS in 2007, 
Nicholls ably challenges the notion of the program as representing true diversity (and 
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acting as ‘edgy text’), revealing a reinforcement of integration narratives and white 
cultural hegemony pervading the vast majority of the program. But the program enjoyed 
broad popular support from Muslim communities. Shakira Hussein, a University of 
Melbourne academic with strong community links, noted that ‘on the drama front, East 
West 101 has been very popular among Muslim viewers (women in particular—hot 
male lead!) …’ (interview 16 August 2012). Other programs about Islam that may be 
susceptible to critique and that have also been largely well received within Australian 
Muslim communities include the Halal Mate documentaries (Rebel Films 2007–); 
Muslim hosted panel television program Salam Café (RMITV 2005-2007; GNWTV 
2008) (originally screened on community television network Channel 31); and The 
Trial (360 Degree Films 2010), a behind-the-scenes documentary featuring the family 
members of young Muslim men accused (and subsequently convicted) of terrorism 
offences. Importantly, the production of these programs is outsourced by the SBS to 
independent production houses, making them somewhat external to gaining an 
understanding of the true institutional habitus (or ‘matrix of dispositions’ [Bourdieu & 
Wacquant 1992, p. 136]) of the network.  
This article seeks to explore one recent, yet particularly important controversy 
centring on a boycott of the SBS Insight program by a variety of Muslim community 
representatives, academics and activists. In May 2012, boycotters signed an open letter  
to SBS (see Veiszadeh 2012) expressing their deep concern about the representation of 
debates about Islam on two episodes of Insight: ‘Banning the Burqa’ aired 21 September 
2010 (SBS 2010b) and ‘Fear of Islam’ aired 2 November 2010 (SBS 2010c). The open 
letter emphasised potential ‘adverse implications’ for the Muslim community in 
Australia (Statement on behalf of the Signatories from the Islamic Community quoted 
in Veiszadeh 2012). They signalled their refusal to participate in an upcoming program 
about polygamy that they were concerned would feature negative representations of 
Muslims. While not as visually spectacular as thousands of Vietnamese protesters in the 
streets outside the SBS headquarters (as in one 2003 protest about the choice of 
Vietnamese language news provider), the signatories collectively represented thousands 
of Australian Muslims, including those potentially most vulnerable to racism and social 
exclusion, such as migrant women. Significantly, this boycott occurred across Australian 
state borders and sectarian lines, a remarkable occurrence given the diversity of 
Australia’s Muslim populations, and illustrating widespread concern. That the boycott 
received such support irrespective of SBS’s history of promoting respect and recognition 
of Muslim communities also speaks to the deep breach of trust felt by signatories in 
relation to the Insight program. In exploring the dynamics of this controversy, it is 
important to consider contemporary SBS representations of Islam, and analyse the 
Insight episodes in question and the motivations of boycott signatories. These present a 
nuanced picture of a notable shift away from the SBS commitment to multiculturalism. 
This shift holds significant political implications when noting SBS as a barometer of 
Australia’s affinity with multiculturalism. 
Research method 
The study is part of a series of research projects funded by an Australian Research 
Council grant (DP0988246) examining citizenship and belonging among British and 
Australian Muslims. This research broadly set out to examine factors enabling and 
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inhibiting active citizenship. The research is based upon a wide variety of sources, 
including the open letter to SBS from Muslim signatories, interviews with former 
guests of the Insight program (de-identified for anonymity), interviews with boycott 
signatories, specially purchased SBS ratings data, engagement with the SBS board and 
current executive producer of Insight (as at May 2013), and a critical discourse analysis 
of the Insight episodes central to the controversy. This multifaceted approach enables 
the content of the programs to be analysed and reflected upon in adequate depth, 
revealing the key issues raised and their relationship to the SBS Charter (SBS 2011a). 
According to Paltridge (2006, p. 179), critical discourse analysis is premised upon the 
view that ‘social and political issues are constructed and reflected in discourse’, that 
‘power relations are negotiated and performed through discourse’, that ‘discourse … 
reflects and reproduces social relations’ and that ‘ideologies are produced and reflected 
in the use of discourse’. Critical discourse analysis is considered of particular utility in 
exploring ‘issues [of] gender, ethnicity, cultural difference, ideology and identity and 
how these are both constructed and reflected in texts’ (Paltridge 2006, p. 179).  
This analysis adapts the key components of critical discourse analysis outlined by 
Paltridge to analyse the representation of Islam and debates about the place of Muslims 
in Australia on Insight. The analysis considers how the content of the conversation and 
debate is presented, including the physical position of the moderator, what concepts and 
issues are emphasised on the program and what are ‘played down’. It considers the 
background knowledge, attitudes and points of view that the debates presuppose and 
what the moderator foregrounded in the debates, that is, what the moderator 
emphasised as important in her comments shaping the direction of the debates. The 
analysis also considers power relations in discourse—who has the most authority and 
power in the discussion, as well as who is left out of the debate. Due to the 
multidimensional nature of the discourse, in this case played out through visual imagery 
accompanying the debate, it is also important to consider the physical positioning of 
guests. Cumulatively, these sources and this approach contribute to a better 
understanding of the pressure points on SBS, and by extension the Australian society, in 
relation to its commitment to multiculturalism.  
SBS’s  Insight 
The Insight program is funded and produced within the SBS network, with the 
production team granted full autonomy over form and content (Insight Executive 
Producer, interviewed 29 Jun. 2012). It is hosted by an experienced and articulate 
moderator, Jennie Brockie, and is marketed by the SBS as ‘Australia’s leading forum for 
ideas’. The SBS Insight website (SBS 2011b) claims the program is pioneering a highly 
interactive and engaging format unique to Australian television. Viewers can follow the 
program on Twitter and Facebook, subscribe to email alerts, be involved in a ‘live chat’ 
with program guests after the show and contribute to the ‘Your Say’ message board, 
with the option of ‘liking’ or ‘disliking’ others’ contributions. Viewers can also suggest 
topics, seek to join the studio audience, download the show either online or in podcast 
form and download transcripts of the show. Consequently, those at home and with 
internet access can feel like they have a significant stake in the program and its outcome. 
Insight may be considered at the forefront in using contemporary technology to foster 
democratic engagement and citizenship; this is certainly the case when comparing the 
show to the traditional mainstream networks’ programming for the Tuesday night 
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primetime slot in 2010: The ABC’s 7.30, Channel 7’s My Kitchen Rules, Channel 9’s 
Big Bang Theory and Channel 10’s Talkin’ ‘Bout Your Generation.2 The closest rival 
for the use of technology and wide studio and virtual audience participation is Q&A on 
ABC on Monday evenings nationally at 9.30 pm.  
Topics on Insight seek to address contemporary public issues and have included 
diverse topics such as climate change, gambling, sexual consent and mental health. The 
Insight website promotes the program as: 
… a great leveller, no one has special status. Politicians, business leaders and 
experts sit alongside kids and punters, swapping stories and arguing about 
everything from property prices to relationships, climate change or the nature of 
courage. Jenny guides the conversation, ensuring as many people as possible have 
their say. There's no hiding behind press releases and spin on Insight, it’s face-to-
face debate. 
(SBS 2011b) 
The Insight program format may be considered as having many attributes that can 
indeed contribute to the SBS Charter, particularly increasing the ‘awareness of the 
contribution of a diversity of cultures to the continuing development of [Australian] 
society’, promoting ‘understanding and acceptance of the cultural, linguistic and ethnic 
diversity of the Australian people’ and ‘reflect[ing] the changing nature of Australian 
society, by presenting many points of view and using innovative forms of expression’ 
(SBS 2011a). Insight has the potential to embody the socially inclusivist charter of the 
network and to achieve ‘transformational cultural interaction’ (Jakubowicz 2006, p. 
254).  
Given the current challenges faced in understanding the relationship between Islam 
and multiculturalism in Western contexts, it was perhaps predictable that Insight would 
face its greatest challenges in accurately representing the nature of debate in line with 
the Charter in episodes directly examining Islam. 
The Insight episodes, ‘Banning the Burqa’ and ‘Fear of Islam’, must be understood in 
the broader context of the program prior to analysis. While the program features guests 
from a variety of faiths and religious traditions, Islam remains the only religion that has 
actively featured as the central topic of any Insight episodes. This is significant given 
that over 60 per cent of Australians identify as Christian, and 2.4 per cent Buddhism—
the second largest faith in Australia. Furthermore, Hinduism is the fastest-growing 
religion. None of these faiths or religions have yet been selected as a focus, yet a variety 
of Insight episodes have brought Islam and Muslims into the spotlight. The first such 
episode dealt with controversial comments made by the Sydney based ‘Mufti’ of 
Australia, Sheikh Taj el-Din al-Hilali, and aired 7 November 2006 (SBS 2006). 
Subsequent episodes in which Muslims were central to the program included ‘Somali 
Australians’, aired 8 September 2009 (SBS 2009), in the wake of the 2009 arrest of 
several young Muslims for terrorism offences, and ‘Stopping the boats’, aired 1 June 
2010 (SBS 2010a), a program framed primarily around Afghan Muslim refugees.  
The program generally commences with moderator Jenny Brockie providing an 
overview of the topic and the goals of the show before asking questions of the two 
international keynote guests. These guests speak to opposing sides of the topic before 
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invited guests are asked to provide their perspective. After some initial exchanges, 
Brockie allows anyone appearing particularly keen to talk to provide their view, often 
having to choose between many people seeking to make a point. The microphone on a 
boom is then lowered over that individual. The moderator must be perceptive enough to 
have an awareness of the topic and who to choose to speak and when. Ultimately, this 
rests upon the aims of the program and its producers. Editing processes ensure a 
perspective of the debate for viewers that is vastly different from the bird’s-eye view of 
audience participants. Close-up shots, wide panoramic shots and focusing on some 
speakers over others (instead of screening the footage in its entirety) ensure a particular 
representation of the debate, and important insight into the matrix of dispositions 
informing the network’s approach.  
Guest selection 
Invited guests on Insight ensure an incendiary mix of polarised perspectives. Both 
episodes analysed feature two invited international guests screened live to the audience 
through satellite, and at least half a dozen local guests directly invited by SBS to 
participate in the show. Guests are almost exclusively activists and are clearly sought out 
for their established and often highly polarised political perspectives. A case in point is 
that of Hizb ut-Tahrir Australia media representative Uthman Badar, the only 
individual who gained speaking time on both Insight episodes about Islam. A 
transnational organisation with active branches in Europe, Australia and Central and 
South East Asia, Hizb ut-Tahrir has emerged at the head of the Islamist challenge to 
the West. The organisation ‘presents democracy and multiculturalism as a ploy to 
weaken the faith, remove Muslims from the truth and subdue them’ (Akbarzadeh & 
Roose 2011, p. 314). A pamphlet produced by Hizb ut-Tahrir Europe (released in 
Britain) states: 
Since the ruling in the West is on the basis of Kufr and Haraam, then the 
parliament undertakes actions of legislation without referring to Allah … i.e. it 
undertakes actions of kufr and sin. 
(Hizb ut Tahrir Europe 2010, p. 19) 
The Australian arm of Hizb ut-Tahrir held a conference in July 2010 in the Sydney 
suburb of Lidcombe (in the demographic heartland of Islam in Australia). Widely 
publicised through both the internet and media coverage, the conference was attended 
by approximately 400 individuals from a Sydney based Muslim population of over 
100,000.3 This represents less than half of a per cent of Sydney based Muslims and, 
certainly, not all attendees were members of the group. Yet Hizb ut-Tahrir was twice 
invited by SBS to address a national audience, conferring political currency for its 
perspectives.  
Three narrow perspectives and their representatives appear to have been sought out 
by the program producers for these two shows: moderate Muslim, Islamist Muslim and 
far-right, often fundamentalist, Christian and anti-Muslim political perspectives.4 
These are played off against each other to maximise tension. The vast majority of the 
Insight audience are left blind as to the political motivations of actors on the show and, 
importantly, to the marginality of many of these actors in key debates. It is here that 
arguments about audience agency and individual critical introspection of program 
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content are weak. Research considered above (for example, Dunn [2005] and Rane 
[2010]) reveals that the majority of viewers are very likely to have little in-depth 
knowledge of contemporary discourse or the legitimacy of key actors and program 
guests within it. Many guests have very little credibility in the community or with those 
they claim to represent, yet they are conferred authority by being on national television, 
presenting the uninformed viewer seeking ‘insight’ into the issue with a poor level of 
understanding upon which to make any critical judgement.  
As an example of this, one young Australian Muslim woman found herself in a 
minority among fellow Muslims on the ‘Banning the Burqa’ episode. In a private 
interview, she reflected: 
I feel they continuously pick and choose the not-so-good English speaking 
Muslim leaders to so-call ‘represent Islam’, but in actual fact they are doing more 
harm due to the lack of English. They always choose the same ones who don’t 
speak English well! In fact, in doing so, they are actually making a mockery out of 
Muslims.  
(SBS Insight ‘Banning the Burqa’ guest, interviewed 24 Jun. 2011)  
It is pertinent to consider that the largest demographic group of Muslims in Australia is 
second generation, born and raised in Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2006, 
2011). Yet program producers have substantively overlooked this, continuing to engage 
foreign-born males to speak on behalf of Muslim communities. Many of these foreign-
born figures lack both the linguistic skills and cultural capital to make substantive 
contributions. As a primary example of this, the SBS Insight website for ‘Banning the 
Burqa’ (SBS 2010b) features four keynote guests, of whom three are middle-aged males 
and the other is a woman who wears the garment. In this way, the show in fact 
perpetuates stereotyping of Islam and sexism that are continually levelled against the 
burqa.  
Right-wing guests on the show have often written books (printed and distributed by 
far-right publishing houses) critical of Islam, such as Mark Durie’s The Third Choice: 
Islam, Dhimmitude and Freedom (2010) and Nonie Darwish’s Now They Call Me 
Infidel: Why I Renounced Jihad for America (2006). These quasi-intellectual texts 
represent part of a broader assault by the Christian far-right against Islam in Western 
contexts. Within this schematic, the Quran is portrayed as an inherently violent book, 
and Western Muslims are viewed as seeking to Islamise the West. Individuals 
expressing these perspectives are utilised on the show as catalysts for debate.  
Previous work by the authors of this paper has examined the debate about Islam 
being monopolised by moderate Muslims on one hand and extreme Muslim and right-
wing perspectives on the other; the loudest voices dominant while the ‘silent majority’ 
remain largely unheard in debate (Akbarzadeh & Roose 2011). The nature of such 
debates confounds the fact that the vast majority of Australian Muslims are neither 
practising nor visibly ‘Muslim’ and nor are they highly politicised. These Muslims live 
their lives without engaging in public discussion about their religion, and make a 
valuable contribution to the development of whatever Western nations they live in. 
These stories, however, easily falling into the category of ‘confrontainment’ (Lorenzo-
Dus 2009, p. 99), have not captured the attention of the SBS network or Insight 
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producers. It is clear that reaching consensus is not a goal of the program. As the creator 
of the ‘confrontainment’ concept, Lorenzo-Dus, points out: 
The problem with the performance of both consensus and demurred dissent on 
television, of course, is that neither seems capable of generating half the 
entertainment that disagreements do, especially when viscerally performed. 
(Lorenzo-Dus 2009, p. 99) 
Program analysis:  ‘Banning the Burqa’  
and ‘Fear of Islam’ 
Both ‘Banning the Burqa’ (aired 21 Sep. 2010) and ‘Fear of Islam’ (aired 2 Nov. 2010) 
were screened in the context of wider contemporary political events of the time, and it is 
necessary to understand these in greater detail to situate the content of each episode.  
The decision by Insight producers to focus on the burqa was a result of the topical 
nature of this garment at that time.5 France was enacting laws to ban the burqa across 
the Republic, and Australian political figures had discussed the issue throughout 2010. 
The debate was sparked by South Australian Liberal Senator Cory Bernardi who 
blogged in May 2010 that the burqa had emerged ‘as the preferred disguise of bandits 
and ne’re do wells’ (Bernardi 2010). Other conservatives quickly sought to add their 
voice to this perspective, and soon this topic had assumed national significance. In this 
context, Insight sought to examine the issue of the burqa with a clear reference to 
France, asking ‘what exactly is driving the ban?’. This episode promised to delve into the 
key underlying issues that relate to the burqa and its place in Western societies. 
Less than two months later, the SBS broadcast another Insight episode on Islam. 
This was not situated in relation to any notable event at the time, though it sought to 
capitalise on rising criticism of multiculturalism across Europe, and anti-Islamic 
sentiments. It is likely that the success of the ‘Banning the Burqa’ episode, with 307,000 
viewers nationally compared to an average of 207,000 for the Insight program 
throughout 2010 (OzTAM Pty Ltd 2011a, 2011b, 2011c)6, also influenced the decision 
to examine a similarly emotive topic in ‘Fear of Islam’. The key questions for the 
program were ‘is this anti-Islamic sentiment on the rise in Australia?’ and ‘what is 
driving this increased hostility?’. Both episodes stated that they would examine key 
drivers to the debates and reveal insights into the underlying causes. Instead, they 
merely provided entertainment by putting political views on display.  
Debate content 
The premise of the episodes was to examine the key drivers to banning the burqa, and 
discover why anti-Islamic sentiment is on the rise. It is instructive to consider the core 
themes of the episodes and key debates foregrounded. ‘Banning the Burqa’ examined 
the perceptions that (a) the freedom of Muslim women is undermined by the garment, 
and (b) the burqa poses a security threat in Australia and can be used to commit crimes 
while concealing identity. The episode also included discussion about whether the burqa 
was a central element to Islam. ‘Fear of Islam’ focused on arguments that (a) the Quran 
preaches violence and (b) Islamic and Western values are incompatible, particularly in 
relation to sharia law and human rights abuses in Islamic nations. None of these topics 
exhibit any reflexivity about the long history of xenophobia and racism that has been 
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entrenched in Australian and, indeed, broader Western cultural histories, and that may 
contribute to negative attitudes towards Islam.  
The ‘Banning the Burqa’ episode embraces populist far-right criticisms as the starting 
point. Provocative proclamations act as incendiary devices for the program, effectively 
forcing Muslim guests to respond on the defensive, irretrievably polarising the debate. 
Early in the episode, Jacques Myard, a right-wing member of the French National 
Assembly that has continually campaigned against the burqa, asserts: 
I will tell you something, I think when some people say we are stigmatising a 
religion, we are stigmatising women who are wearing such clothes, I’m sorry, I am 
the victim. I am the victim because those people refuse me to see their face, to 
communicate with them and I think this violates the common will to live together 
... 
The manner in which a privileged white older male with considerable social status and 
power can claim victimhood may be laughable, yet it is taken seriously. The moderator 
clearly buys into to the ‘Islam versus the West’ polemic that characterises this binary. 
Moderator Jenny Brockie points to a member of the audience and asks: 
Amina, you are 22, you wear the burqa here in Australia, do you understand how 
a Western country could see it as a symbol of inequality, that women are being 
forced to cover their faces? 
This question, addressed to an Australian Muslim woman challenges the authenticity of 
Amina as an Australian. ‘Here in Australia’ and ‘how a Western country … ’ are 
prefaces that automatically marginalise the guest and firmly place her as the ‘other’. 
Amina’s response is equally instructive, taking this distinction as the starting point: 
It is not for the West or anyone else for that matter to decide what is inequality, 
our religion has given us equality. It is not for him or Cory Bernardi or Fred Nile 
to tell us we are oppressed or wrong is being done to us, we chose to wear this. So 
no I don’t understand where the West is coming from. 
The argument made by Muslim guests, including Tariq Ramadan and Sibel Bennett, is 
that the burqa is a matter of personal choice and piety. Muslim women wearing the 
burqa felt that they had the right to choose to wear it and that it was in accordance with 
the example of the wives of the Prophet. But right-wing guests continued the polemical 
assault. Cory Bernardi, the Australian agent provocateur leading public condemnation 
of the burqa asks 
... why all of a sudden are we … making exceptions for our security and our 
cultural practices in this country for a tiny subset of people who are adhering to a 
fundamental, an extreme fundamentalist version of a religion? 
The episode clearly descends from its stated objectives into outright conflict, reflecting 
the manner in which incendiary comments and the specific mix of guests polarise the 
program. The premise clearly shifts from talking about ‘why people find the burqa 
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confronting’ at the beginning of the discussion to ‘whether the burqa should be banned’ 
by the end. 
A very similar process of almost immediate polarisation of discourse can be observed 
in the ‘Fear of Islam’ episode. Brockie commences the program by asking what is 
driving the increased hostility to Islam in Europe and the United States. The first guest, 
Reza Aslan, an academic and author, starts by considering the potential influences of 
economic distress and war weariness and links the increase to historical incidents of 
religious discrimination in a response directly addressing the core premise of the show. 
The next guest invited to speak is Nonie Darwish an extreme right-wing anti-Muslim 
campaigner and Director of Former Muslims United, described by United States 
Democratic Senator Eric Adams, as ‘bringing hate, hate and poison to a diverse country’ 
(Daily Mail Online 2011). Darwish instantly places the blame directly upon Islam and 
makes the Islam/West distinction: 
The West is very concerned and actually afraid because the media is not 
informing them. There are too many moderate Muslims who are trying to 
whitewash the fears and concerns of the West ... Islamic doctrine promotes 
violence and hatred against non-Muslims. 60% of the Quran is dedicated to 
cursing and spreading hatred and violence against non-Muslims who are called 
‘Kaffir’ ... Islam looks at the outside world in a very—they want to achieve 
conquering the world ...  
Muslims guests are forced to respond to Darwish on her terms, refuting the base of her 
argument that Islam is the problem, and disproving her empirically baseless assertions. 
Randa Abdel-Fattah, a ‘moderate’ Muslim, highlights precisely this point when she 
claims ‘We are starting from a point of view that Islam and Muslims—well Islam is a 
violent, misogynistic, hateful religion and that is where the debate always starts from’. 
Reza Aslan similarly responds:  
… I have to say that it’s a weird feeling to have to respond to a Christian leader of 
an anti-Muslim organisation—it would be like having to respond to a Muslim 
leader of an anti-Jewish organisation about Judaism ...  
Nonetheless, the program continues with Islam being examined as the problem, 
buttressed by the stoking of the conflict by Mark Durie who claims: 
In the end, there are some disturbing messages in the Quran, there were 
declarations of war against non-believers, there’s a declaration that Islam should 
be triumphant over other religions. The problem is this is not just in the book, but 
preached throughout the Islamic world ...  
While alternate positions are heard on the episode, the effect of extreme right 
incursions into the debate have the effect of pulling the discussion to the right, well 
away from potential examinations of underlying cultural causes such as xenophobia and 
cultural racism. This is clearly demonstrated when late in the program, after an 
advertisement, Brockie redefines the premise of the debate: ‘Tonight we are talking 
about Islam and whether its values conflict with democracy’. The program clearly fails 
to meet its stated objectives and contribute at a level beyond that of entertainment. Far-
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right participants gain a national platform for their views, while Muslim participants 
buy into the debate and either criticise other Muslim participants’ views, or desperately 
struggle to defend Islam as compatible in Australia. A few guests raise the marginality 
or validity of the criticisms directed against Islam, but their appeal to commonsense is 
overshadowed by polarised views. This makes resolution of the debate and dialogue next 
to impossible, with a raft of potential negative implications for the attitudes of those 
watching at home, including, as noted by Dunn, Klocker and Salabay (2007, p. 582), 
the potential for this to contribute to increased racism and even violence from those 
viewers with the least awareness and greatest insecurity in regard to Islam and Muslims. 
Dramatisation and conflict are tested and proven mechanisms for increasing 
television ratings and, by extension, the premium on advertising space. It is instructive 
to note that the ratings for the two 2010 Islam episodes were significantly higher than 
the average 2010 SBS Insight program7 (see Appendix: Table 2). Despite this, even 
with the emphasis on polarisation and conflict, Insight’s Islam based episodes did not 
come close to being top rating for the network in 2010 (see Appendix: Table 1). The 
critical discourse analysis reveals that power, as well as the ability to create drama and 
conflict, is firmly located in the hands of the moderator and producers of the program, 
and that through the selection of guests and discourse that Islam and Muslims are 
represented in a largely negative and polemical manner.  
The boycott:  an exploration of the events of May 2012 
The impact of SBS representations on Australian Muslim communities was corrosive, 
undermining trust that many Muslims had placed in the network to provide a non-
polemical representation of Islam and Muslims. When, just over a year later, the 
program featured an episode on arranged marriage focusing primarily on Muslims, 
distrust among community representatives, activists and academics began to rise. 
Shortly after, Insight researchers began approaching members of Muslim communities 
for a program on polygamy, and the distrust reached a critical mass. Muslim 
representatives were strongly concerned that the program would bolster the portrayal of 
Islam as a patriarchal religion. As one signatory colloquially explained, it was expected 
that the program would imply that ‘Muslim men are randy old buggers who can’t keep 
it in their pants and are always looking for a new sex slave’. Activist and Canberra based 
lawyer Mariam Veiszadeh orchestrated a collective response to the attempts by Insight 
to recruit guests. 
An open letter petitioning SBS to inform the network of a collective decision to 
boycott participation was signed by ‘signatories from the Islamic community’ and dated 
7 May 2012 (see Veiszadeh 2012). Signatories included representatives from the United 
Muslim Women Association, Lebanese Muslim Association (NSW), Islamic Council 
of Victoria, Affinity Intercultural Foundation, The Islamic Egyptian Society (NSW) 
and Islamophobia Watch Australia Group. Several individual academics also signed. 
Collectively, these organisations represent many thousands of Australian Muslims and 
span several states, a remarkable occurrence given the highly diverse and contested 
political space of Islam in Australia. The letter detailed the signatories’ reasons for 
choosing not to participate: 
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Previous Insight programs, including those which focused on the burqa and niqab 
and on Islamophobia have not done either of these topics any real justice. 
Instead, Insight’s producers have carefully selected guests from the Muslim 
community that they can pitch against one another in an attempt to show a 
diversity of opinions. While we welcome representations that acknowledge the 
diversity of opinion among Muslims, Insight’s producers have manipulated this 
diversity to create an environment that produces on-air conflict among Muslim 
guests. The end result is not audience appreciation of Muslim diversity, but rather 
further misunderstanding, negative perceptions and alienation of Muslim 
communities in Australia.  
(Statement on behalf of the Signatories from the Islamic Community quoted in 
Veiszadeh 2012) 
Under the heading ‘Impact on Muslim Community and Social Cohesion’, the letter 
continues: 
We feel that Insight's focus on the Muslim community is disproportionate. 
Irrespective of Insight's stated good intentions, the end result is further alienation 
of the Muslim community. Signatories of this letter firmly believe in engaging 
with media, so to take an action like this highlights the seriousness of our 
concern.  
(Statement on behalf of the Signatories from the Islamic Community quoted in 
Veiszadeh 2012) 
The clear pattern of responses from this letter (and interviews) was the perception that 
the Insight episodes about Islam were damaging to the place of Muslims in Australia. 
One signatory from a major-city-based organisation stated in an interview their view 
that the proposed polygamy episode would contribute to increased divisiveness and 
misrepresent Australian Muslims to the detriment of Australian society: 
An almost non-existent issue was being taken to centre stage on television. The 
polygamy issue like other similar issues covered in the media regarding Muslims 
would have given the impression that Australian Muslims do not accept the values 
of Australian people and culture and hence do not belong to the social and 
cultural fabric of Australia. In my view, such coverage of Muslims ultimately 
harms Australia itself by unsettling the delicate social harmony and goodwill 
within society.  
Similarly another interviewee claimed:  
We felt having Muslims on a show like this, often times conducted in a 
confrontation and in a defensive manner, only reaffirms the stereotypes and 
prejudice, rather than counters them. This is not helpful nor would it be of any 
benefit to the Muslim community. It may even be more damaging.  
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Yet another interviewee claimed, ‘By Insight focusing solely on these negative types of 
narratives, it gives the impression that this is the only reality ...’ But despite strong 
concern that Insight has the potential to be inflammatory and cause harm, the boycott 
letter and signatories also revealed a deeper level of trust in the SBS Charter to 
contribute to mutual understanding. The letter concluded by stating a willingness to 
work with the SBS: 
In the long run we recognise that it is not feasible for Muslim community 
organisations to have a blanket boycott of Insight. We wish to develop a more 
constructive relationship with Insight's producers and researchers. However, at 
present and with the current editorial line adopted by Insight, we have come to 
the conclusion that it is not constructive for the signatories of this letter to take 
part in your upcoming program on polygamy and plural marriages/relationships.  
(Statement on behalf of the Signatories from the Islamic Community quoted in 
Veiszadeh 2012) 
Importantly, signatory interviewees were largely positive in their summation of the SBS 
outside of the Insight program and unanimous in their view that the SBS has an 
important role to play in providing a platform for promoting inclusivity for Australian 
Muslims and in challenging negative stereotypes. As one signatory stated, capturing the 
group’s sentiment, ‘SBS should be working to quell the dissent that is rising in Australia 
that is faced by any ethnic group’. Another claimed, ‘As SBS is partly funded by the 
public, it needs to perhaps be socially responsible to ensure that all programs on its 
channel contribute to creating social cohesion and harmony’. The fact that despite the 
development of distrust about the Insight program signatories continued to display faith 
in the SBS is important. It is instructive that they sought to engage the SBS through 
the mechanism of an open letter and expressed a willingness to continue to work with 
the network in the future, revealing that the situation was not, in their eyes, 
irretrievable. This, and the response of SBS to the boycott reveal important evidence 
about the nature of multiculturalism in the contemporary SBS. 
The SBS responded quickly to the open letter, meeting with Mariam Veiszadeh and 
others within days. While clearly taken seriously by the network and current program 
producers, the decision to boycott the program remained after the initial meeting. As 
Veiszadeh, reflecting on the experience, states, ‘we raised our concerns, and in turn 
listened to SBS clarify their position, but in the end we remained unconvinced of the 
merits of appearing on the show’ (Veiszadeh 2012). Signatories interviewed were 
unanimous in criticising the SBS response. One claimed it was ‘initially defensive’ and 
ultimately offered ‘platitudes in taking issues on board’. One interviewee stated: 
I feel that SBS really tried to sidestep the issue, particularly with no written 
response from the general manager. Apparently our concerns have been widely 
circulated but this does nothing towards increasing dialogue between the 
signatories, community members and SBS producers.  
One community leader highlighted what a more substantial response may have been: 
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An exemplary response would have been not to go ahead with the polygamy 
program at all. Not only they went ahead with the topic, they managed to find 
some unknown Muslims to bring up on the program. Very disappointing indeed 
…  
The mistrust clearly remains between the SBS Insight program and many signatories of 
the letter, irrespective of attempts at mediation between SBS executives and leaders of 
the boycott. This reveals a clear rupture between a key group of Australian Muslim 
leaders, the program and, by extension, the wider network. While it remains unknown 
whether this trust will be rebuilt in future, it is clear that this controversy highlights a 
clear tension between the SBS’s socially inclusivist multicultural charter and actual 
practice. 
Conclusion 
Multiculturalism is a victim of 9/11 and the politicisation of Islam. This research reveals 
that multiculturalism, at least in the in-house produced programs that best reveal the 
network’s approach and habitus, is in retreat. In the specific episodes of Insight 
examined, the SBS appears to have sought a compromise between commercialism and 
quality debate. Islam is commoditised, packaged and sold to a mass audience in a bid to 
increase the show’s ratings and commercial viability. Extremist voices have been 
brought in to contest the core propositions of the debate, providing them with a level of 
legitimacy that belies their actual weight in the wider community. For the ‘uninformed 
viewer’, watching these episodes with an intention of gaining an insight into Islam, the 
effect may be at best confusing, and at worst reinforcing stereotypes of Muslims as 
inherently fundamentalist, violent and in conflict with the rest of Australia.  
The SBS may be rightfully proud of the contribution the network has made to 
Australian multiculturalism over the years, but this research reveals that the network, 
through its in-house Insight program, is edging away from the socially inclusivist vision 
articulated in the SBS Charter and moving into dangerous territory. The negative 
impact of this shift is already visible in relation to Australian Muslims. If, as Kevin 
Dunn (2005) has revealed, over half of Australians know very little about Islam, and 
many feel threatened by Muslims, the result of these polarising programs is arguably to 
decrease the level of acceptance of Australian Muslims among the viewing public. The 
Insight program manifests an identity crisis for SBS and points to growing strains on 
Australia’s commitment to multiculturalism.  
Appendix 
Table 1: Comparison between average 2010 Insight  and SBS Network 
top 20 average 
Program Date Net Viewers % 
difference 
SBS Insight 
Average 2010  
2010 Average 207,000 0 
Top 20 Programs 
2010 
2010 Average 745,700 Up 260% 
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Source: OzTAM Pty Ltd. 2011 Tabulated Data (Special Purchase). 
Table 2: Number of program viewers 




SBS Insight Average 
2010 (Base) 
2010 Average 207,000 0 
Banning the Burqa 21 September 2010 307,000 Up 48% 
Fear of Islam 02 November 2010 275,000 Up 33% 
Source: OzTAM Pty Ltd. 2011 Tabulated Data (Special Purchase). 
Table 3: Number of program online comments (2010) 




SBS Insight Average 
2010 (Base) 
2010 Average 267  0 
Banning the Burqa 21 September 2010 703 Up 163% 
Fear of Islam 02 November 2010 726 Up 172% 
Source: SBS Insight Online Archives. Comments made on online program forum in 2010. 
Endnotes 
1 In early May 2012, the Australia Labor Government, with the support of the Greens, 
increased this dramatically to $158.1 million (Bodey 2012). While this may be interpreted as 
a renewal of an Australian Government commitment to multiculturalism, the impact of this 
on the program content on SBS remains to be seen and can only be measured over coming 
years.  
2 Here we do not reference television shows that run on digital free-to-air networks.  
3 Paper co-author Joshua Roose was in attendance. Figures are based on a headcount average 
conducted at the beginning and in the middle of the conference.  
4 It must be understood that both ‘moderate’ and ‘Islamist’ Muslims are actively political. 
Moderate Muslims assert that the space exists for Muslims to engage in the West as citizens, 
while Islamists assert the incompatibility of Western and Islamic values as if these are easily 
defined and contrasted. The far right of the political spectrum, similarly to Islamists, argue 
the incompatibility of Islamic values and Western values and seek to attack what they view as 
the creeping Islamisation of Western society.  
5 The burqa is a garment worn by Muslim women that covers the hair and face but not the 
eyes. It is worn by a small minority of Australian Muslim women. 
6 Increased public interest was also highlighted by the considerably higher participation rates 
on the show’s online forum. The ‘Banning the Burqa’ episode registered 700 online 
comments between 21 September 2010 and 2 November 2010. The total as at June 2011 was 
705 comments. Topics such as ‘A Bigger Australia’ on 18 May 2010 (428 comments), 
‘Religion in the Classroom’ on 25 May 2010 (531 comments) and ‘Stopping the Boats’ on 1 
June 2010 (478 comments) were less popular. The only polarising topic to beat ‘Banning the 
Burqa’ for total comments was ‘Fear of Islam’ with 737 comments. 
7 An analysis of online comments on these programs mirrors the success in attracting viewers 
(see Appendix: Table 3). ‘Banning the Burqa’ and ‘Fear of Islam’ saw the highest number of 
comments posted online compared to other episodes for the whole of 2010. The next closest 
ROOSE & AKBARZADEH— THE SPECIAL BROADCASTING SERVICE AND THE 
FUTURE OF MULTICULTURALISM 
111 
episodes to yield a high number of online responses were ‘The [Climate] Sceptics’ (572), 
‘Religion in the Classroom’ (528) and ‘Stopping the Boats’ (478)—all well behind.  
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